


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## Empowerment: if it matters, how do we measure it?

*Conference paper*

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**E M B A R G O**

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## **Empowerment: if it matters, how do we measure it?**

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### **Abstract**

Empowerment, that is “enhancing an individual’s or group’s capacity to make purposive choice and transform that choice into desired actions and outcomes”, is now part of development rhetoric. This paper offers a conceptualization of empowerment that can be used to turn the idea into measurable actions. Using the concepts of asset based agency and institution based opportunity structure, it is suggested that investments in both can increase people’s capacity to make effective choices and contribute to poverty reduction. The paper presents an analytic framework for structuring analysis and action drawing on evidence of the relationship between empowerment and poverty outcomes from five country case studies.

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<sup>1</sup> This paper represents the work of a core team led by Ruth Alsop and comprising Mette Bertelsen, Jeremy Holland and Nina Heinsohn. A fuller version of this paper will be published in late 2005.

## **Empowerment: if it matters, how do we measure it?**

Ruth Alsop, World Bank, Washington, D.C.<sup>2</sup>

Empowerment, has become a familiar term within most development agencies and appears with increasing frequency in government's policy documents.<sup>3</sup> At the time of writing thirty two Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper's (PRSPs) have empowerment either as an objective or reference it as a means to the end of poverty reduction. Yet, the interpretations of what empowerment means – analytically and operationally -- are multiple and often inconsistent. In addition, there is limited material available on the practicalities of measurement, tracking and evaluating progress made towards empowerment.

This paper offers one way of understanding and applying the concept. It first discusses why empowerment is important to poverty reduction and then presents a simple framework than can be laid across both analytic and operational work. The use of this framework for analyzing and tracking empowerment is then illustrated with examples drawn from a five country study and other World Bank aided projects.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> This paper represents the work of a core team led by Ruth Alsop and comprising Mette Bertelsen, Jeremy Holland and Nina Heinsohn. A fuller version of this paper will be published in late 2005.

<sup>3</sup> Empowerment is defined as "enhancing an individual's or group's capacity to make purposive choices and transform those choices into desired actions and outcomes". Thus defined, empowerment equates with the capacity to make effective choice.

<sup>4</sup> The country case studies were undertaken as part of an initiative to understand and measure empowerment. Country studies were managed and written up by Lynn Bennett (Nepal), Arianna Legovini (Ethiopia), Mike Walton (Brazil), Mike Woolcock (Indonesia), and Emanuela di Gropello/Nina Heinsohn (Honduras). These task managers worked in collaboration with the following international and local consultants: Kishor Gajural, Kim Armstrong and Sandra Houser (Nepal), the Ethiopian Economic Association (Ethiopia), Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Shubham Chaudhuri, Patrick Heller and the Centro de Assessoria e Estudos Urbanos (Brazil), Patrick

## 1. Why is empowerment important?

In their recent book, *Growth and Empowerment*, Stern, Dethier and Rogers propose a strategy for development that demands a dual approach: building a climate that encourages investment and growth and, at the same time, empowering poor people to participate in that growth.<sup>5</sup> Empowerment is suggested as both a goal and a driver of development. This view resonates with much other work linking empowerment and other development goals which makes the point that efforts to change power relations, so that people have an equal capacity to make effective choice, have both intrinsic and instrumental worth.<sup>6</sup> Arguments for the intrinsic value of empowerment are found in the philosophical underpinnings of literature on: democratization and decentralization<sup>7</sup>; non-monetary aspects of poverty reduction<sup>8</sup>; and, human rights approaches to development.<sup>9</sup> The instrumental arguments for empowerment are simple: empowerment associates positively with achievements in other development outcomes, including growth, poverty alleviation and the realization of human rights.<sup>10</sup> While this paper offers a limited empirical basis supporting the positive association between empowerment and development outcomes, it does provide robust information that adds to the existing body of work indicating this relationship exists. Perhaps more importantly, it also provides a framework for future research to test the association.

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Barron, Leni Dharmawan, Claire Smith, Rachael Diprose, Lutfi Ashari, Adam Satu, and Saifullah Barwani (Indonesia), and ESA Consultores (Honduras). For additional information please visit: [www.worldbank.org/empowerment/](http://www.worldbank.org/empowerment/)

<sup>5</sup> Stern et al, 2005

<sup>6</sup> Narayan, 2002;

<sup>7</sup> Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Kaufmann et al, 2003; Moore and Putzel, 1999

<sup>8</sup> Bourguignon et al 2003; Sen, 1999a

<sup>9</sup> Alsop and Norton, 2004; DFID, 2000; Eyben 2003; Moser and Norton, 2001.

<sup>10</sup> Heller et al. in Alsop, Holland and Bertelsen, forthcoming; Lokshin and Ravallion, 2005; Varshney, 2005

In recognition of the importance of context to measurement and interventions seeking to empower individuals or groups, each of the five country studies contributing to the development of the empowerment framework were undertaken in a different country and within a different substantive development area. While acutely aware of diversity of indicators used in analysis, each case provides evidence of the association between investments in empowerment and either direct poverty reduction or development outcomes that closely correlate with poverty reduction. For example, the country case from Brazil indicates a robust relationship between participatory budgeting as a mechanism of collective empowerment and reduction in extreme poverty, overall poverty, and poverty of children (see box 1). The analysis also demonstrated a decrease in inequality and an increase in health and education investments, access to services and human development outcomes.

**Box 1: Poverty Effects of Collective Empowerment through Participatory Budgeting in Brazil.**

Local government is a critical domain for the exercise of democratic rights and for making effective public choices for both citizens and those in local government. A range of factors have however often conspire against good governance, democracy and equity at the local level. It is not unusual for the social and economic power of local elites to translate into disproportionate influence over the political process and top-down, insulated and non-transparent decision-making structures have made it difficult for ordinary citizens to exert voice. Democratic deepening begins with the democratization of local government – that is the empowerment of citizens and local government.

That is precisely what participatory budgeting initiatives have tried to achieve in a variety of municipalities in Brazil. Introduced in the city of Porto Alegre in 1990, and since implemented in at least two hundred other municipalities throughout the country, participatory budgeting introduces direct participation into the process of municipal budget formulation.

The analysis of the poverty impact of participatory budgeting was undertaken as part of the World Bank's "understanding and measuring empowerment initiative" in two parts. First, using data from a ten-city, matched-pair study carried out in 2004, the impact on empowerment of these initiatives was examined: did these reforms promote empowerment, and if they did so, under what conditions did this take place?. Second, using an extensive data set covering all 5,507 municipios of Brazil, a range of sources were used to generate a data set spanning 1991

to 2000. The effect of participatory budgeting was then estimated for development outcomes including municipal finances; public service delivery; human development; and growth, poverty and inequality.

The paired analysis of participatory budgeting (PB) and non-participatory budgeting municipalities yielded a range of findings. Examination of the processes through which citizens engaged local government between 1997-2000 in 10 cities (5 PB and five non-PB cities) paired by key attributes (size, region, political party configuration) revealed that cities in which participatory budgeting took place provided for much more effective forms of engagement than their non-participatory budgeting counterparts. The scope of citizen influence ranged from making general demands to specifically shaping patterns of investment and service delivery. Though there was great variation between participatory budgeting cities they were all marked by an expansion of the opportunity structure. Even the most restricted version of participatory budgeting had the baseline effect of increasing the flow of information about municipal governance, creating spaces for citizens to voice their demands and subjecting what were once highly insulated and discretionary processes of decision-making to public scrutiny and even iterated bargaining. However, the introduction of participatory budgeting had a much more mixed impact on agency as measured by the capacity of civil society to self-organize. Analysis indicated that the impact of participatory budgeting on the capacity of civil society to organize depends in large part on the pre-existing nature of civil society

The evidence from the statistical analysis of the large data set indicated a striking positive association between the introduction of participatory budgeting and reduction in extreme poverty, especially in contexts where the initial incidence of extreme poverty is high. Impacts were also indicated in relation to reducing overall poverty, poverty amongst children, inequality and increasing access to public services and human development (see Annex 1, tables A1.1 and A1.2).

*Source: Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Patrick Heller, Shubham Chaudhuri and Marcelo Kunrath Silva, 2005*

When initial conditions were accounted for, the country case study from Ethiopia also demonstrated that – while outcomes could certainly be improved – investments made to empower women through the World Bank aided Women’s Development Initiatives Project (WDIP) enhanced women’s chances of moving out of poverty.<sup>11</sup> The mixed method study covering a sample of over 1,000 respondents and testing the empowerment framework’s concepts of domains, measured empowerment status and impact against indicators in the

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<sup>11</sup> Legovini, 2005

state, economic and social domains of women's lives.<sup>12</sup> Box 2 presents some of the study's key findings.

### **Box 2: The Effects of Investing in Women's Empowerment in Ethiopia**

***In the state domain:*** Ethiopian women fare poorly in terms of political representation and protection under the law. Results from the study however suggest that there are ways to increase women's empowerment, in particular through literacy, provision of information and increasing women's awareness of issues affecting the quality of their own lives (particularly legal and political rights provided by the state, and the impact of traditional beliefs relating to genital mutilation, early marriage and women's sub-ordinate status). While the impact of organizations on awareness was not conclusive, the interactive enquiry coupled with the apparent effects of participation in WDIP suggests that women's association, the capacity to aspire, and their belief in both their ability to speak and right to be taken into account are also key to enhancing their ability to make effective choice.

***In the economic domain:*** both econometric and self-assessment results led to the conclusion that investments in women's empowerment through WDIP improve economic outcomes. Beneficiary self-assessment also indicates that the largest impact is obtained by older groups—the ones that received project funding more than two years ago (93 birr change in income and 587 birr change in assets). Market indicators suggest project beneficiary women engage in more tradable activities than non-beneficiary women and between 12 and 15 percent more beneficiaries than non beneficiaries go to the produce and trade markets to buy inputs for their activity and sell outputs and fewer beneficiary than non-beneficiary women think access to market is a constraint to their economic activity. However, financial markets are still elusive. Beneficiary women are less likely to ask for a loan or to receive one. In addition, the average size of the loans obtained is less than half that of non-beneficiary women. As a result, beneficiary women feel more credit rationed than non-beneficiaries, and are more likely to place financial constraints among the top three problems in engaging in economic activity (87 vs. 84%). (see Annex 2, Table A2.1)

***In the social domain:*** the study found a positive association between participation in WDIP: and personal freedom, power to make decisions in their household and breaking restrictive social norms – such as wearing trousers, going out alone to public places, and riding bikes, animals or carts. Eighty-one percent of WDIP participant respondents reported new knowledge of the harm of certain traditional practices (such as genital mutilation), and were involved in teaching others about them (55%). Thirty-five percent of women indicated that since their participation in WDIP they had begun to send their children to school. WDIP participants were less likely than the non-treatment group to uphold informal social rules, apart from, surprisingly more WDIP participants believed that they should obey their husband upheld their husband's right to beat them. As a direct impact of WDIP group activity. 78 percent of WDIP participants reported an increase in the number of friends and people they could rely on in case of need. 73 percent said their access to kebele officials increased and 59 percent that they have learnt to speak up in public (See Annex 2, Table A2.1).

*Source: Legovini, 2005*

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<sup>12</sup> The original report by Legovini also considers the psychological as a domain of people's lives. However, because empowerment a relational concept i.e. it deals with relative power between between actors, this chapter treats psychological variables as assets, that is a stock from which benefits can flow.

In Honduras, an evaluation of the Honduras Community Based Education Project -- which seeks to enhance access to and quality of education and to empower communities by enabling them to influence school management – tested two hypotheses. First, that the decentralization of school management empowered communities (as represented by the school councils -- AECOs<sup>13</sup>) in relation to the Ministry of Education. Second, that the project empowered previously excluded community members in terms of their participation in school councils and activities. For the first hypothesis data and information collection focused on whether or not the project had established AECO's abilities to act as effective school decision-making body. To test the second, data were gathered on equality of engagement in school councils. Box 3 summarizes key findings – demonstrating that, in the context of the education sector in Honduras as with municipal budgeting in Brazil, while both asset and rule variables had a positive association with empowerment and education outcomes, agency variables were less important to empowerment outcomes than opportunity structure variables.

**Box 3: Empowerment Through School Committees in Honduras**

Measured in terms of a composite school council empowerment index, 70 percent of all school councils achieved high levels of empowerment, that is, the majority of AECOs (school councils) were using the opportunity to make choices about school management. However, data relating to the empowerment of excluded groups indicates that these groups used the presence of opportunity to engage in school management less than other community members.

For both councils and excluded people, opportunity structures had greater impact on empowerment outcomes than agency. In the case of school council empowerment, the use of the manual outlining the AECO's responsibilities associated positively with school council's use of opportunity, i.e. their degree of empowerment. The distance to banks and delays in the payment of promoters' salaries and in the government transfers negatively affected school council empowerment.

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<sup>13</sup> *Asociación Educativa Comunitari*, Community Association for Education).



The study also examined impact of the project upon education outcomes and found a positive instrumental relationship between empowerment outcomes and education outcomes. The evaluation showed that the academic performance was higher in project supported schools than in control groups.

*Source: di Gropello and Heinsohn, 2005*

The case study from Indonesia formed part of a larger piece of research—the KDP and Community Conflict Negotiation Study. This included an assessment of the impact of the *Kecamatan* Development Project (KDP) on communities' ability to manage local conflict. While KDP was not designed as a conflict resolution program, the core question of the Community Conflict Negotiation Study was whether or not KDP “spillover effects” build the conflict management assets of villagers and changes the rules by which conflicts are resolved (see Box 4).

#### **Box 4: Measuring the Power to Resolve Conflict in Indonesia**

A key assumption of the study was that project and country contexts ultimately shape localized manifestations of individual and group power. In the case of KDP, the project context was one of a very conscious movement away from the notion of projects as the deliverer of a particular product and towards a notion of projects as a way to trigger and support processes in which villagers exercise discretion in solving self-identified development problems. Far from merely tweaking incentives for individual involvement in civil society, KDP has systematically opened up the exercise of state-level power to collective decision-making and influence by groups on the local level. A similarly decisive factor in the Indonesian country context has been the primacy of collective identities in shaping group-based decision-making. Precisely because of these project and country contexts, KDP's approach to empowerment has been distinctly collective. As such, the primary form of power that the study examined—conflict management capacity—was an inherently relational one.

The Indonesia study proposed that in addition to KDP's complaints mechanisms, a key process by which KDP aims to alleviate poverty and improve local governance—convening a series of facilitated forums/meetings at the hamlet, village, and *kecamatan* level to encourage and institutionalize broader community participation in decision-making and priority-setting—might also incrementally shift power relations on local levels. As an example of collective capabilities, cases of marginalized groups influencing everyday conflicts amount to a kind of “meta-indicator” of empowerment.<sup>14</sup> The study did not assume that KDP causes this form of empowerment. Rather, it examined a two-way association between certain KDP practices and conflict

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<sup>14</sup> Evans (2002). Rao and Walton (2004a) similarly develop the concept of “equality of agency” to consider how individual opportunity is influenced by relational social and cultural systems that ultimately impact poverty and inequality.

management capacity of marginalized groups. The study was based on the hypothesis that as instances of everyday conflict resolution come to mirror the “adaptive problem solving”<sup>15</sup> processes of well-functioning KDP forums, then the distribution of conflict management capacity often expands to include women, the poor, and other marginalized identity groups. That is, where marginalized groups use conflicts to generate dense, diverse, and organized collective action, they may also have become more capable of exercising meaningful influence in conflict management forums. The study explored conditions under which this may (or may not) have been the case, as indicated by heightened associational contact between groups in formalized settings. The *quality* of the associations was also expected to change, characterised by a shift towards more discretionary and transaction-intensive decision-making between alliances of less rigidly bounded and prescribed identity groups.

*Source:* Gibson and Woolcock, 2005

The Indonesian case study argues that KDP cultivated a set of collaborative routines and rules for conflict management that previously disempowered villagers could use to engage with more organized and influential actors. Within sets of facilitated forums extending from neighborhood to village to sub-district levels, participation in KDP planning and decision making forums often became the first occasion in which villagers from different identity groups allied themselves around purposeful collective action and decision making. External agents introduced new resources/assets into communities, along with rules and structures for managing the inevitable conflict which arose over them. As a result, power relations changed and conflicts were managed, resulting in more effective and faster achievement of development outcomes (see Annex 4).

Finally, in Nepal, the context for the country case analysis was provided by the World Bank aided Nepal Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (RWSS) project. RWSS seeks to promote decentralization and to increase the involvement of beneficiaries and the private sector in rural water supply and sanitation service delivery.<sup>16</sup> This case

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<sup>15</sup> Heifetz (1994).

<sup>16</sup> The study in Nepal was not only part of the effort to understand and measure empowerment but also represents Phase I of the “Measuring Empowerment and Social Inclusion” (MESI), a longitudinal mixed-method research project that seeks to

analysis focused on developing gender sensitive ways to measure levels of empowerment and social inclusion of different groups and determining covariates or influential factor of empowerment and social inclusion. Box 5 outlines the study's hypotheses and preliminary findings, which again indicate that empowerment investments associate positively with development outcomes.

**Box 5: Empowerment and Social Inclusion in Nepal.**

The underlying study hypothesis was that investments in empowerment and social inclusion would result in positive empowerment and social inclusion outcomes and, in turn, these outcomes positively influence human and economic development indicators such as poverty reduction, human security and good governance. More specifically, the study hypothesized that the greater the empowerment and social inclusion of women belonging to traditionally excluded castes, the more i) primary positive changes in the shape of reduced domestic violence for women, less restriction, public intimidation, and violence towards low castes and greater self esteem and community influence for previously excluded groups, and ii) secondary positive development such as improved health seeking behavior, greater contraceptive use, increased involvement in market economy and higher incomes for women.

Regression estimates showed that caste/ethnicity and gender together explained 33 percent of variation in a composite empowerment and inclusion index. In two separate bivariate analyses, one for caste/ethnicity and the other for gender, the study found that caste and ethnicity alone explained 26 percent of the variation and that gender alone explained 7 percent of the variation. The study also found that the influence of caste and ethnicity can be reduced through improved access to education, income earning and asset accumulation opportunities and through participation in groups. This underlines the significance of agency and the importance of increasing people's asset base across both caste and gender. The analysis showed that being a member of one or more groups increased Composite Empowerment and Inclusion Index (CEI) levels by 5 percent net. Ten years of education increased CEI levels by nearly 19 percent while an increase in wealth status by 3 points (in a scale of 1 to 9, where 1 indicates the lowest and 9 the highest level of wealth status) increased CEI levels by 9 percent (see Annex 5).

Through analysis of indexes and disaggregated analysis of individual indicators, the study demonstrated the utility, both in terms of project effectiveness and broader distributional equity of development outcomes, of interventions that focus on asset building for empowerment and institutional reform for social inclusion. Though the study has not yet been concluded, it has so far found that the two communities with the greatest degree of cooperation and inclusion of women from traditionally excluded castes and where women's groups themselves have been the most inclusive and effective, are also the communities that

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understand the processes of empowerment and social inclusion in order learn something about how empowerment and inclusion associate with other development outcomes. See Bennett and Gajurel, 2005.

have the greatest degree of success achieving the results of the RWSS project. In contrast, the most polarized communities, where a single powerful group dominates, are those where the project has been least effective in bringing sustainable drinking water to the community.

*Source:*Bennett and Gajurel, 2005

The five cases not only acted to test the effect of investments in empowerment on poverty and other development outcomes, they also acted as the vehicles to test and refine an analytic framework and develop a range on indicators. The next section describes this approach, identifying core areas for analysis before moving on to a discussion what data can be found where.

## **2. Unpacking Empowerment**

The framework suggested in this section presents a conceptualization of empowerment that can guide both empowerment interventions and serve to guide measurement and monitoring of empowerment processes and outcomes. It can be used by development practitioners engaged in the analysis of empowerment at the intervention, project and/or the country level, and as a part of poverty or governance monitoring. In addition to the testing and modification of the framework that took place within the country case studies, the framework also draws heavily on discussions of power in social and political science theory literature. Since Hobbes' discussion of the social contract and state-citizen relations, many other social and political scientists have explored power as a concept involving relations between individuals or groups.<sup>17</sup> Social theorists such as Giddens


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<sup>17</sup> Key amongst these authors are Gramsci (in Hoare, 1978), Weber (1904), Lukes (1974) , Parsons (1937), Giddens (1984) and Foucault (1980). In addition, this framework and its subsequent development owe much to the recent work of Bennett (2003); Bourdieu ( 1989); Clegg (1989); Kabeer (1999); Krishna (2003); Lukes (1974); Malhotra et al. (2002); Sen (1985) and (1992); and Smulovitz, Walton, and Petesch (2003). Readers are referred in particular to the Bennett, Giddens, Lukes and Smulovitz publications for a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of this framework.

(1984) emphasize the relationship between *agency* (the capacity for social agents to make independent choices that generate power) and *structure* (the sets of rules that interact with agency to determine human behavior). The analytic framework used in this paper treats empowerment as contingent upon this relationship.

If a person or group is empowered, they possess the capacity to make *effective* choices; that is, to translate their choices into desired actions and outcomes. As noted above and illustrated in Figure 1, this framework is premised on the belief that this capacity is primarily influenced by two sets of interrelated factors: agency and opportunity structure.

**Figure 1. The Relationship between Outcomes and Correlates of Empowerment**



Agency is defined as an actor's ability to make meaningful choice—this is, the actor is able to envisage and purposively choose options. Opportunity structure is defined as those aspects of the context that determine their ability to transform agency into effective action. Working together, these factors give rise to different degrees of empowerment.

## 2.1 Agency

How can agency be captured or invested in? For purposes of measurement, a person's or group's agency can be largely predicted

by their *asset endowment*. Similarly, if development interventions seek to enhance agency, as the case studies of the previous section show investments in individual or collective assets can greatly enhance agency. Assets are the resources that enable actors to be productive and to protect themselves from shocks. The assets requiring measurement (for monitoring or analysis) or consideration in operational work include psychological, informational, organizational, material, social, financial and human.

Some assets are easier to measure than others. For example, designing an intervention to enhance, or undertaking a survey to gathering information on, human assets (such as skills or literacy) is less problematic than doing the same for social assets (such as social capital) or – even more difficult -- psychological assets (such as the capacity to envision).<sup>18</sup> Yet, all are critical in this treatment of empowerment which understands power to result from a combination of “resources” and “rules”.<sup>19</sup>

The complex interaction among assets also presents analytic challenges. The endowment of one particular asset, such as education (a human asset) often gives an actor greater access to information (itself an asset) and at times improves his/her capacity to envision alternative options (a psychological asset). It is clear that the endowment of a single asset, such as ownership of land or capacity to aspire, can affect a person’s or group’s ability to make meaningful choices. An actor’s or group’s command over one asset can also, however, affect the endowment of another asset. For example,

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<sup>18</sup> Alkire, 2004. surveys a series of subjective measures of agency; that is, measures that capture people’s self-evaluation of whether or not they are free to act as agents. There is also a rich literature available on measuring social capital (see [www.worldbank.org/socialcapital](http://www.worldbank.org/socialcapital)). Appadurai, 2004, was the first to clearly articulate the idea of a “capacity to aspire”.

<sup>19</sup> Giddens, 1984

education (a human asset) often gives an actor greater access to information (itself an asset) and at times improves his/her capacity to envision alternative options (a psychological asset).<sup>20</sup> Similarly, for groups of people, collective savings (a financial asset) can give access to enhanced productive assets. In these cases, more than one asset contributes to the capacity to make meaningful choices. This has implications for data collection and analysis, as information is required on the range, quantity and value of asset endowments, and analysis can test for the effects of one asset on another as well as for their association with empowerment outcomes.

## **2.2 Opportunity Structure**

Should an individual or group be able to choose options, the effective realization of that choice is contingent upon the *formal and informal institutions* that shape an individual's and group's opportunity structure. These institutions include laws, regulatory frameworks and norms governing people's behavior. The presence and operation of these institutions may associate with individuals and groups access to assets and, in general, determine whether these people can choose to use the assets to achieve desired outcomes.

Utilitarian, preference-based approaches to analysis of choice assume that choice is a straightforward process in which actors make rational choices designed to maximize utility. This "rational choice" approach is questioned, however, by those who recognize that choice is constrained by social circumstance or social rules, with implications for individual and group expression of agency as discussed above. Kabeer, in discussing women's empowerment, cites Bourdieu's notion

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<sup>20</sup> Research in India found that the addition of one more source of information to a person's repertoire increased participation in local level governance by more than five additional percentage points. Alsop et al. 2001

of *doxa* meaning those aspects of tradition and culture that have become so habitual as to be “naturalized”.<sup>21</sup> These traditions are rooted in deeply entrenched cultural institutions. Women, for example, are often locked into a cultural framework which means they perceive their disempowerment to be right and proper. Many of us not living in Ethiopia, for instance, would find it hard to comprehend women’s belief “that a husband is justified in beating his wife for at least one of the following reasons,” burning food (65 percent of Ethiopian women agree), arguing with him (61 percent), going out without telling him (56 percent), refusing sexual relations (51 percent).<sup>22</sup>

Increases in agency, through the accumulation of assets such as education, information, psychological assets and income or consumption wealth, have been shown to associate with changes in gender based inequalities in many countries as well as influencing other traditional (informal) institutions such as untouchability in India and Nepal. However, the relationship does not always hold and in practice the struggle to use agency effectively can be extremely hard for previously disempowered people or groups. When discussing agency the distinction between habitual choice and reasoned choice therefore becomes important to action, and – depending on the depth of analysis required – thus for measurement.

Formal institutions touch the lives of most people – whether it is a country’s legal framework, tax regulations or more local governance rules, such as what constitutes a quorum in a local committee or how pasture land is managed. As with informal institutions it is not just the presence of rules which measurement efforts need to track, it is the operation of these institutions. In India, for example, the 1992 constitutional amendments reserving seats for women representatives

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<sup>21</sup> Kabeer, 1999; Bordieu, 1977

<sup>22</sup> Central Statistical Authority 2001



has, in many places, been less than entirely successful because social norms that govern women's public behavior undermine women's capacity to operate as political leaders.<sup>23</sup> Changes in legislation, such as these constitutional amendments and subsequent State Acts, often pre-date changes in practice, i.e. the formal institutions are present. In such cases, monitoring outcomes therefore involved tracking the use of these formal institutions.

Examples of tension between formal and informal institutions are particularly apparent in the legal sphere where policies and laws are often weakly enforced, and in many cases provide contradictory or incomplete coverage in their protection of marginalized people. For example, while violations such as female genital mutilation, wife battering, domestic violence, and sexual harassment are outlawed in Ethiopia's Constitution, the penal code contains no provisions for adjudicating them, and existing laws are often applied by judges in a manner reflecting social norms rather than women's rights.<sup>24</sup> As Box 6 further illustrates, the creation and presence of formal institutions does not always mean they operate effectively. It is in understanding, tracking and addressing the interplay of formal and informal institutions that change towards empowerment can be better effected.

#### **Box 6: Formal and informal institutions in Ethiopia**

Most rural people in Ethiopia continue to apply customary laws to their economic and social relationships. This is most apparent, and perhaps most damaging, in the ways in which customary conflict resolution mechanisms and the civil courts are legally integrated. While in theory this integration was meant to enable citizens to retain their ethnic and religious identities, in practice it has reinforced damaging attitudes and customs toward women. Article 34(7) of the Constitution reserves the option to adjudicate disputes related to personal matters in accordance with religious or customary laws, rather than under the civil code, if the parties to the disputes agree. In practice, personal disputes, particularly between men and women, are frequently directed to traditional adjudication mechanisms by the choice of men, without the consent of

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<sup>23</sup> However, without the force of the constitution, women would have experienced a much longer and harder fight to enter and operate effectively in the political arena.

<sup>24</sup> World Bank 2004a.

women. In Muslim areas, if a husband goes to the *Sharia* court first to institute divorce proceedings, then the wife often does not have recourse to the civil court (World Bank 2004 draft). Focus group discussions among Orthodox Christians in Addis Ketama reported that if there is a conflict between husband and wife, the case is first handled by a traditional court and noted that even if a formal court was approached directly, the case would be passed to traditional courts (Legovini 2004).

*Source:* Alsop and Kurey (2004)

### **2.3 Interaction between Structure and Agency: Degrees of Empowerment**

The analytic framework introduced here goes beyond income-based and utilitarian approaches to poverty “in which real incomes are presumed to translate ..[without problem].. into well being via utilitarian consumption choices”.<sup>25</sup> Empowerment is based on tackling the differences in capabilities that deny actors the capacity to make transforming choices. As box 7 illustrates, it is a dynamic process through which the interaction of agency and opportunity structure has the potential to result in improving individuals’ or groups’ capacity to make effective choice. This concept has similarities with Sen’s notion of expanding human capabilities, or freedoms, by focusing on an individual’s ability to “enhance the substantive choices they have”.<sup>26</sup>

#### **Box 7: The Importance of Assets and Opportunity Structure to Effective Political Choice in India**

[Elected] representatives who are landless participate [in local elected body meetings] to a significantly lesser extent than those who own some land. As the landless are dependent economically, they are therefore less likely to raise dissenting opinions against their potential employers in the village—a conclusion that is also supported by case study data. Education and access to information also significantly associate with participation among elected representatives. Every additional year of education tends on average to raise representatives’ participation by more than two-and-a-half percentage points. A representative who has ten years of education scores on average 27 percentage points higher on this scale compared to another who has no formal education. Similarly, higher access to information is associated

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<sup>25</sup> Evans, 2002, 57

<sup>26</sup> Sen, 1997, 1999

with greater participation among representatives by almost three percentage points, on average, for each additional source of information that they consult.

Respondents stated that individual benefits [from the elected body—the Panchayat] could be accessed only by people who had a relationship with the Sarpanch's [president's] family. Such relationships were based on frequent labor work for the Sarpanch and kin, purchasing goods from shops owned by them, and voting in their favor. A scheduled tribe [low social status] wardpanch said that he had no powers, but that he "and other wardpanches have to go along with whatever the Patidars (the caste group of the Sarpanch) decide in the Panchayat as many of them are dependent on the Patidars for labor.... Many village people are dependent on the Patidars for their livelihoods." The people who feel that they are excluded from the individual benefits of the Panchayat say they lack the awareness of what to do to change the situation and do not know to whom they should turn outside the Panchayat.

*Source:* Alsop, Sjoblom, and Krishna 2001.

Prerequisite to empowerment is an opportunity structure that allows people to translate their asset base into effective agency -- through raised consciousness, better information and through more equitable rules and expanded entitlements. For example, an individual's human assets are improved through completion of secondary education, while at the same time new opportunities for citizen participation in budget allocations are opened up by the institutionalization of local-level budget planning processes. Using the new skills, confidence, and knowledge gained through formal education, and taking advantage of the opportunities opened up in the planning process, that individual is empowered to effectively participate in local-level decision-making. In the Indonesian case study, the opening up of the formal opportunity structure through a project intervention built collective deliberative skills and social capital.

Measurement of or investments in assets and institutions therefore provides *indirect* indicators of, or identification of opportunities for investment in, empowerment. Direct indicators of empowerment are extremely difficult to find in any national sample survey or poverty monitoring system. They are more common within project monitoring systems, but while attempts have been made to

track empowerment outcomes, the indicators used are often rather limited. Prioritizing indicators used by these systems and embedding them within the discourse on power suggests that three direct measures are important for measuring or tracking empowerment. These are:

1. Whether an opportunity to make a choice exists (***existence of choice***).
2. Whether a person or group actually uses the opportunity to choose (***use of choice***).
3. Whether the choice results in desired outcomes (***achievement of choice***).

To illustrate, if a policy or project design team is trying to assess the degree of political empowerment of women, it would need to gather information on (1) whether opportunities for political participation exist, such as whether elections are held, and, if so, (2) whether women attempt to vote; and (3) whether they actually vote. If the same team were using the information to design an intervention to politically empower women they would then need to ensure that the structures and processes of the intervention were such that these three ends were achieved, and monitored.

For several reasons, including the geographic, social, or economic positioning of a person or group, the opportunity to make a desired choice may not exist. To take the case of a rural woman in the hills of Nepal who wants to send her daughter to primary school. If a school does not physically exist within walkable distance, she has no option. It may not matter that the formal opportunity structure – in this case a policy on education for all – exists, if the asset of a local school is not present, the opportunity for that woman to make a choice does not exist.

The use of choice involves measuring whether or not a person or group takes advantage of an opportunity to choose. If a school exists, does the Nepalese woman choose to send her daughter there? She may or she may not. If she does not, analysis of why would involve documenting the interplay between her assets and her opportunity structure. She may choose not to send her daughter to school because she cannot afford shoes to walk to school or to cover the bribe the teacher levies, that is her financial assets are insufficient. She may also not use the opportunity because her mother in law, with whom she lives, strongly feels that girls need no education and that the child is of more use herding the goats. Here there is interplay between informal institutions and economic assets. Or the fact that the woman does not send her daughter to school may simply be because her husband will beat her if she does – another informal rule coming into play. As these examples show, the framework of agency and opportunity structure helps in understanding why and what issues need addressing in operational work and what factors need tracking in monitoring systems. There is one further dimension of the capacity to use choice that needs to be considered. This is whether the use of choice is direct or indirect. The example of the Nepalese women was a direct use of choice. However, in many situations people may choose to indirectly use choice -- for example, by accepting the legitimacy of an elected representative to engage on their behalf. This could occur in a local level budgeting or planning exercise where the costs of direct use of choice are too high for individual citizens to bear.

The achievement of choice is a measure of how far a person or group is able to achieve their desired outcome. If the woman in Nepal has the option to send her daughter to school, and if she makes that choice, does her daughter actually attend school? Again, if she does

not, the analytic framework suggests assessing whether there is something in the opportunity structure, such as that this is a low caste girl and only Brahmins and Chettris (high caste) children are allowed to attend the school and the girl was sent home on her first day. The lack of effectiveness of choice could also relate to the assets the girl or her family have. She may not have the requisite skills to attend a class, she may not continue attending as the school may require a child to wear a uniform or shoes and the family cannot afford to buy them for her.

While these degrees of empowerment capture people's or group's capacity to make effective choice, it is too simplistic to automatically treat these three degrees of empowerment as a continuum, with the final degree – the effective use of choice – considered as the most desirable degree of empowerment. The subject matter of choice has to be considered in relation to each degree. If, for example, in a well functioning democracy an actor chooses not to go to a local council meeting because his/her/their elected representative is considered effective, this cannot be considered as a lesser degree of empowerment than if the person or group participated in the meeting. The person or group has chosen an indirect route of participation -- one that many citizens in established democracies use. In this case, the operation of the formal institutions that influence an actor's choice to use an opportunity (the second degree of empowerment) are effective to the point that they result in indirect use of opportunity. Each degree, and the two key groups of factors associated with that degree, have therefore to be considered on their own merit.

## **2.4 Where Empowerment Takes Place—Domains and Levels**

The use of agency and opportunity structure to frame the analysis of empowerment is helpful, but leads to two further questions. First, does a person's or group's capacity to make effective choices vary according to *what* he/she/it is doing? Second, does empowerment vary according to the *level* at which a person or group is acting? The answer to both is yes. To illustrate, an Indian woman experiences a different form of empowerment when she is trying to exercise choice over domestic resources within the household from that which she experiences when in a bank trying to access a loan. Her experiences will also differ according to whether she is trying to operate in her village, at a market or office located at a distance from her village, or in a capital city.<sup>27</sup>

These added complexities in the measurement of empowerment are dealt with by conceptualizing three different *domains* and three different *levels* of actors' lives. This conceptualization is important to an analytic framework that seeks to span the multiple political, social, and economic conditions found in different countries. As the following discussion illustrates, this additional piece of the framework is viable in different contexts and, if required, can allow for cross-country comparisons of actual or changing relative degrees of empowerment for different people.

### **2.4.1 Domains**

The three domains include:

- *State*, in which a person is a civic actor;
- *Market*, in which a person is an economic actor; and

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<sup>27</sup> In this example, one Indian woman may well experience different degrees of empowerment from another. These differences can largely be explained by assets—such as education, information, and social capital—and opportunity structure—such as social norms of behavior associated with caste and gender, or formal rules giving her access to loans, markets, or services.

- *Society*, in which a person is a social actor.

These domains are further separated into eight sub-domains:

- State is divided into the sub-domains of *justice*, *politics*, and *service delivery*;
- Market is divided into the sub-domains of *credit*, *labor*, and *goods*; and
- Society is divided into the sub-domains of *family* and *community*.

In each of these sub-domains, the individual or collective actor experiences a certain degree of empowerment. This is likely to vary between people or groups and will vary according to whether an actor is in the position of a provider (supply side) or client (demand side).

As box 8 shows, this may vary between people or groups.

#### **Box 8: Empowerment in Different Domains of Life**

In the ***state domain***, for example, citizens and their organizations may experience very different degrees of empowerment in terms of accessing justice, participating in politics, or accessing social services. In India, a well educated, high-caste man with good social connections would experience a higher degree of empowerment in all state three sub-domains than his low-caste, illiterate counterpart.

In a perfect or “complete” ***market domain***, everyone plays by a set of equitable and transparent rules with highly efficient outcomes for the parties entering a transaction (Rajan, 2004). However, differences in control over resources and information, a lack of contract enforcement, or the ability to distort or control market prices through monopolistic practices, can result in highly inefficient and unequal outcomes. Hence a purchaser may enjoy a marketing monopoly or control price information, thus forcing producers to accept below-market prices.

In the ***social domain***, social norms will combine with local implementation of formal institutions to affect the choices available to individuals and social groups. A son in an Indian household, for example, is likely to experience a higher degree of empowerment than a daughter, yet, in her community, a high-caste daughter would experience a higher degree of empowerment than the daughter of a low-caste family.

*Source: Alsop, Bertelsen and Holland, forthcoming 2005*

#### **2.4.2 Levels**

Within each domain and sub-domain, people operate and experience empowerment at different levels (administrative boundaries).



- The *local level* comprises the immediate vicinity of a person's life. This is likely to be the level of an area contiguous with their residence.
- The *intermediary level* comprises a vicinity which is familiar but which is not encroached upon on an everyday basis. This is likely the area between the residential level and national level.
- The *macro level* comprises a vicinity which is the furthest away from the individual. This is likely to be the national level.

For example, in Ethiopia the macro level could correspond to the federal, the intermediary to the woreda and the micro to the kebele or village. In India the macro level might correspond to the state, the intermediary to the district and the local to the village.

## **2.5 The Framework Summarized.**

In summary, empowerment is experienced in different **domains** of person's life (the state, the market, society) and at different **levels** (macro, intermediary and local). Each domain can be divided into sub-domains. At the intersection of domains and levels, people can experience different **degrees of empowerment**, addressing the issues of whether and to what extent a person or group is empowered. The degree of empowerment is contingent upon two clusters of interdependent factors—the **agency** and **opportunity structure** within which the actor operates. Thus, analysis of agency and opportunity structure helps explain why an actor is empowered to one degree or another. Table 1 summarizes the empowerment framework.

**Table 1: Summary of Analytic Framework**

DOMAIN		DETERMINANTS AND OUTCOMES								
		LEVEL								
Sub-Domain		Macro			Intermediary			Local		
		Agency (A) <sup>1</sup>	Opportunity Structure (OS) <sup>2</sup>	Degree of Empowerment (DOE) <sup>3</sup>	A	O	DOE	A	O	DOE
State	Justice									
	Politics									
	Public Service Delivery									
Market	Labor									
	Goods									
	Private Services									
Society	Intra Family									
	Intra Community									

<sup>1</sup> Agency: measured through endowment of psychological, informational, organizational, material, financial, and human assets.

<sup>2</sup> Opportunity Structure: measured through presence and operation of informal and formal rules.

<sup>3</sup> Degree of Empowerment: measured through presence of choice, use of choice (direct or indirect), effectiveness of choice.

### 3. Using the Framework for Analysis and Monitoring.

The framework provides an analytic structure that can be used to (1) focus empowerment practice by, for example, identifying determinants of empowerment that an intervention needs to focus upon, (2) structure efforts to monitor change and evaluate the impact of a specific project that has empowerment as one of its goals, (3) provide an analytic structure for in-depth research, (4) frame indicators for monitoring progress and changes in empowerment at a national-level, and (5) frame indicators for tracking relative changes in empowerment among different countries. The objective and context of each intervention determines which aspects of the framework to use and how to collect and analyze data. This remainder of this paper focuses on analysis and monitoring.

### **3.1. The Value Added of an Empowerment Approach to Poverty Analysis**

In the context of poverty analysis and monitoring an empowerment perspective means that poverty is not approached only as a question of how much income a person generates or how much they consume or spend, but that poverty is also treated as the lack of ability to choose to act and move towards another standard of living or state of well being. Treating poverty as a matter of deprivation in the exercise of choice aids understanding of *why* some people are more likely to be impoverished than others. It moved analysis from the technical, involving the measurement of income, consumption or expenditure, to the relational, involving the measurement of the relative capability of people. This complements more conventional utilitarian analyses of poverty based on income and consumption measures. It extends poverty analysis to an assessment of a person's relative capacity to achieve a desired outcome given their asset base and institutional environment.

### **3.2 Indicators and Measurement<sup>28</sup>**

Poverty reduction traditionally focuses on providing resources and services to address needs and enhance material well-being. As suggested above, a focus on empowerment brings an additional emphasis on people's choices and opportunities and with it the need to analyze and track changes in these. Although empowerment is now seen as a legitimate developmental goal in its own right -- and there is a growing body of anecdotal and case study evidence suggesting that empowerment also brings improved poverty reduction and other

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<sup>28</sup> Refer to Alsop, Bertelsen and Holland, forthcoming 2005, *Empowerment in Practice: From Analysis to Implementation*, Directions in Development series, World Bank Washington D.C for further discussion.

development outcomes -- robust analysis on the association between (i) investments in empowerment and empowerment outcomes, and (ii) empowerment and development outcomes, is far from widespread.<sup>29</sup> This is not surprising given the challenges involved. Unlike more traditional measures of material poverty, an empowerment approach has to capture dynamic processes and relational changes that are less predictable, less tangible, more contextual and more difficult to quantify in data collection and analysis.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, while poverty measurement is applied to individuals, or households as aggregate units, the process of empowerment can also require the collective expression of choice.<sup>31</sup>

### 3.2.1 Types of Indicators and Sources of Data

Section 2.3 distinguished between *indirect* and *direct* measures of empowerment. Empowerment can be measured *indirectly* either by measuring asset endowments or by measuring opportunity structure. With respect to asset endowment, existing LSMS or Household Income and Consumption-type survey instruments generate plenty of data on asset ownership, including measures of human capital, social capital and access to productive assets. Table 2 provides examples of indicators of asset endowment.

**Table 2: Indirect Indicators of Empowerment: Asset Endowment<sup>32</sup>**

Asset endowment	Indicator (sex disaggregated)	Existing sources/instruments
Psychological assets	Capacity to envisage change	IQMSC
Informational assets	Frequency of radio listening	IQMSC

<sup>29</sup> See Narayan (ed) 2005, for a summary of multi-disciplinary perspectives

<sup>30</sup> Graham and Pettinato, 2005; Malhotra et al, 2002; Uphoff, 2005.

<sup>31</sup> Kabeer, op cit

<sup>32</sup> Tables 2 and 3 prepared by Jeremy Holland who also undertook the background research on the empowerment content of existing survey instruments.

Organizational assets	Membership of organizations	IQMSC
Material assets	Land ownership	LSMS economic activities module
Financial assets	Household expenditure level	Household Budget Survey
Human assets	Literacy level	LSMS education module

IQMSC = Integrated Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social Capital; LSMS – Living Standards Measurement Survey;

With respect to opportunity structure, it is important to recognize in choice of indicator the gulf that often exists between the *presence* and *operation* of such institutions. In Ethiopia, for example, the opportunity structure for women’s empowerment has been addressed through a government commitment to gender equality through the National Policy on Women (1993) and by the removal of discriminatory laws in the new Constitution (1995). Yet these institutions are poorly enforced, with no provision in the penal code for adjudicating them and a tendency amongst judges to pronounce in ways that do not take account of women’s rights. International agencies such as Freedom House have identified indicators and developed indexes that track progress in the operation of institutions, particularly in the state domain. These and other national indicators can measure the operation of institutions to ensure and protect economic, political and social freedoms. Table 3 presents some examples of indicators for measuring the operation of empowering institutions.

**Table 3: Indirect Indicators of Empowerment: Opportunity Structure**

Domain	Indicator	Existing sources/ instruments
State (justice)	• Index of civil liberties	• Freedom House
State (political)	• Index of political rights	• Freedom House
State (public service delivery)	• % budget allocation in line with PRSP • % population unable to access at least one basic service in the previous year due to (i) cost, (ii) physical distance, (iii) social	• PRSP policy matrix • World Bank Country Policy

	distance	and Institutional Assessment
Market (labor)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % employers complying with state regulations on core labor standards</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• N/A</li> </ul>
Market (goods)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Distribution of productive asset ownership by income quintile</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• LSMS-type survey</li> </ul>
Market (private services)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % women/ethnic/religious minorities accessing specified financial services in previous year</li> <li>• No. of formal transparency and accountability mechanisms for financial service providers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• N/A</li> <li>• N/A</li> </ul>
Society (family)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No. of formal justice cases filed against violators of women's rights legislation (domestic abuse) per year</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WB Country Policy and Institutional Assessment</li> </ul>
Society (community)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exclusion from community associational life based on social identity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• N/A</li> </ul>

In addition to recognizing the contributions of existing instruments, beginning with a review of existing data or potential future surveys reduces possibilities of duplication—where surveys are already undertaken in countries—and enhances opportunities to easily integrate parts of a “base” empowerment modules into other national-level survey activities.

In terms of opportunity structure, measuring institutions is complicated by the gap between the presence of rules and the politicized and socially constructed reality of the enactment of those rules. Measurement of institutions therefore requires a mixed-methods approach that includes national-level tracking of legislation, regulations, and procedures and, ideally, local in-depth probing of the operation of informal institutions, or at least the specification of well-informed assumptions about the operation of informal institutions.

However, beyond aggregate measures of concepts such as rule of law, accountability and corruption, direct indicators empowerment are at an early stage of development,<sup>33</sup> although some themes, such as women's empowerment, have been subjected to more frequent

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<sup>33</sup> Stern et al, 2005, 187

attempts to measure change.<sup>34</sup> In general though, data on degrees of empowerment are not currently available through any other survey instruments and therefore need to be collected as primary information.

### **3.2.2 Diversity in Measurement Needs<sup>35</sup>**

The application of the approach suggested in this paper is not difficult but does require context specific application. The focus of any effort to measure and explain empowerment will determine which indicators are chosen and where they are clustered. For example, the Honduras case study examined whether the devolution of authority over schooling matters to community education councils led to the empowerment of parents in relation to school staff. Specifically, it assessed whether and to what extent parents influenced school-related decision-making. Indicators clustered in the service delivery and community sub-domain, at the local level. In Ethiopia though, where the effects of a women's empowerment project provided the context for enquiry, indicators clustered at the local level in the sub-domains of household, community, legal services and goods.

Each of the five country case studies used the idea of "power to" as their analytical reference point, as opposed to treating empowerment as a zero-sum game in which one person or group gains power at the expense of another person or group, that is has "power over". The country studies also recognized an iterative relationship between individual or group agency and structure of opportunity, but differed in their analytic emphasis according to the project or initiative context (See Table 4). Those initiatives with delivery/ accountability dimensions, particularly Brazil and Honduras, brought a stronger

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<sup>34</sup> Kabeer, 1999

<sup>35</sup> This section owes much to the work of Bertelsen, and is more fully described in Alsop, Berletsen and Holland, forthcoming.

analytic focus to institutional change and transformed development outcomes through citizen participation. These projects were designed to emphasize creation of formal local institutions for empowerment and the creation of assets to support the operation of those institutions. The projects in Ethiopia and Nepal gave greater weight to agency-building through increasing investment in or access to a range of assets. The Indonesia case study clearly prioritized the iteration of structure and agency by identifying “deliberative spaces” created by community-driven development projects for inclusion and voice in conflict resolution. Table 4 summarizes the implications of these issues for measurement.

**Table 4: Case Study Analytic Focus**

<b>Case Country</b>	<b>Emphasis in analysis of empowerment</b>	<b>Level of Measurement</b>	<b>Actors</b>
Brazil	What are the changes in financial assets (measure of agency) and formal institutions (measure of opportunity structure) for civil society participation and exercise of choice (measure of empowerment)?	Groups at municipal level	General citizen organizations, elected representatives and government staff
Ethiopia	What is the position of Ethiopian women in terms of formal and informal institutions (legal status, political participation, status in the household)?	Individuals and groups at village level	Women
Honduras	What is the capacity of citizens to participate in management of school responsibilities, has there been an institutional change in the function of the school councils within the decentralization process (interaction between changes in formal institutions and measures of empowerment)?	School management groups at village level	General citizens, some focus on women, indigenous and poorest population
Indonesia	What is the capacity of the groups of villagers to manage given conflicts seen as small processes (measure of the empowerment effect of new formal institutions on informal institutions)?	Interest groups at village level	General



Nepal	Has an intervention empowered previously excluded people in terms of delivery of development benefits (the empowerment effect of new formal institutions on traditional, informal institutions)?	Caste and gender groups at village level	Marginalized groups, Women, Caste focus
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As suggested above, this paper introduces core ideas and suggests relations between those that people wishing to understand, analyze and operationalize empowerment can apply to a range of situations. However, because of the context specific and relational nature of empowerment the depth of substantive coverage of data collection, analysis or intervention cannot be prescribed in the abstract. Neither can directions of causality be hypothesized. Both are at the discretion of those undertaking the measurement. This is deliberate. In developing this approach to measuring empowerment, core elements of empowerment that could be measured and used within and across a range of countries and situations were identified. However, while the framework focuses on generic domains, levels, and degrees of empowerment, the indicators, variables, and their values are likely to be country- and context-specific.

In the five countries in which the framework was applied, each country team identified the domains and levels of analysis relevant to their interests as well as the indicators to use for measurement, and the values placed on variables. Some analysts may be uncomfortable with this flexibility, but mixed methodology studies that include efforts to analyze prior information on the context are both a common feature of many research and monitoring efforts and proved sufficient for analysts to hypothesize likely associations and causal relations for testing. The approach in this paper provides users with an “analytical lens” which sets out areas of enquiry and then allows adaptation to the specifics of a situation. In addition, in the common situation of scarcity

of research or monitoring resources the framework assists in prioritization of focal areas.

### **3.2.4 Examples of Application**

The final part of this paper outlines how each of the country studies approached the task of measuring and tracking empowerment, and provides examples of specific indicators used in each. While the indicators used differ from study to study, many have similarities despite the variation in focus and scope of the studies. There is also convergence in the domains in which the studies focus their analysis. Only one of the five country cases, Ethiopia, worked with all three domains (state, market and society). The other four all focused on the state and the societal domains. A matrix of indicators within each domain, structured by the framework, is provided in Annex 6.

#### ***Measuring the collective empowerment effects of Participatory Budgeting in Brazil***

The Brazil study focused on measuring empowerment within the state domain and within that the sub-domains of politics and service delivery. Also included were a small number of indicators in the social domain and, more specifically, the sub-domain of community. Since the locus of the analysis was municipal budgeting, analysis concentrated on the “intermediary level”.

Analysis of empowerment involved assessment of changes and the effects of changes in both the opportunity structure -- as a result of the introduction of PB institutions, and agency -- by comparing the evolution of civil society organization’s capacity for autonomous action in municipalities with and without PB.

The study addressed the effect of changes in opportunity structures by assessing trends in the participatory nature of municipal budgeting. Opportunity structure was measured on a continuum from clientelistic politics with no participation at one end and associational politics with binding forms of participation at the other. A municipality's position was determined through analysis of 4 sets of indicators related to: i) *the mode of engagement* -- whether direct, delegated, mixed or none; ii) *formalization of the process* -- whether formal, informal or none, and the existence of rules and procedures governing the participatory inputs; iii) *decision-making power* -- whether they are of a consultative or binding nature or non-existent; iv) *the scope of discussion*, capturing a range of governance functions the participatory processes had influenced -- none, making general demands, budgets, policies or mixed.

Key variables to measure agency included: a) civil society's access to information, seen as vital for active participation, and b) social and human capital factors within civil society. Changes in agency centered around two axes: i) *mode of intermediation*, that is, the level of associationalism, the level of clientelism and the level of exclusion of civil society organizations, and ii) *the degree of self-organization*, that is, the extent to which the organizations were dependent on other organs or individuals politically or economically or whether they were autonomous in terms of management as well as ideology.

### ***Measuring Women's Empowerment in Ethiopia***

The Ethiopia study was exceptional among the five studies in that it has gathered data on women's assets, their opportunity structure and degrees of empowerment in all three domains – the state, the market and society. Asset and degree of empowerment

indicators mainly correspond to the local and intermediary level. These included human, social, material and psychological assets. Opportunity structure indicators also encompassed the macro level and considered both on the formal rules of the game, such as the existence of laws ensuring women's equal treatment within the justice and political systems and the informal rules, such as those operating through widespread traditional courts system or influencing women's behavior.

To illustrate, in the state domain/political sub-domain, the degree of empowerment indicators included the ratio of women to men represented in village and district councils as well as the question of how women are affected by the country's judicial environment. This included both how women are treated within the national judicial system and by the laws upheld in the traditional courts still operating in the country. Assets that might help women both increase their representation (and influence) in the district councils and get a fair treatment in the judicial system included previous participation in associations (organizational assets) or numbers of people they could call on for help (social assets) as well as their level of education (human asset) and self-confidence (psychological asset) and the extent of their awareness of their rights (informational asset). Opportunity structure indicators referenced formal rules of the game such as the existence of laws that ensure women equal treatment within the judicial system and grant them representation in community groups and councils. With regard to informal rules, indicators gauged the extent to which traditional practices operated, making women less likely to obtain justice than men, and/or less able to engage in political matters/public life.

In the market domain/labor sub-domain, one of the degrees of empowerment indicators was the extent to which women are able to

choose their type of employment. Asset indicators captured women's education and income levels, their possession of job-specific skills, and the extent to which they had access to different sources of information. Opportunity structure indicators captured the extent to which cultural restrictions determined the nature of professions women were allowed to pursue, the amount of time women had to dedicate to household chores, and gendered rules governing access to productive assets and markets.

The Project's own impact evaluation had established a series of empowerment indicators for the society domain/family sub-domain, such as the percentage of women who had decision-making power equal to that of their husbands over the number and spacing of children, the use of contraceptives, and conjugal relations. The interactive enquiry led the study team to hypothesize that the extent to which women had a say in these matters associated with such assets as women's education, income, and self-confidence levels, their awareness of reproductive health issues, and their participation in women's groups. Analysis also tested for associations among opportunity structure indicators, such as customs that influence whether or not women are allowed to disagree with their husbands, and whether or not women are expected to play a subservient role regarding sexual conduct.

### ***Measuring organizational and group empowerment in Honduras***

This study addressed several aspects of empowerment resulting from educational decentralization, assessing whether the school council was able to carry out the devolved tasks as well as whether different household and community members were able to participate meaningfully in the school council. The study focused its indicators on

measuring empowerment within the state and societal domains. In the state domain, indicators focused on the sub-domain of service delivery, seeking to assess whether the school councils were able to carry out the devolved tasks. In the societal domain, indicators fell within the household and the community sub-domains, allowing for assessment of whether different household and community members were able to participate in the school council.

Using the concepts of assets and opportunity structure, a series of factors that influenced the council's capacity to assume its new tasks was identified. Examples of assets that were found to help councils carry out their newly assigned functions included the amount of relevant information and training the councils received. The opportunity structure for school council empowerment was found to be divisible into both formal rules, such as the regulations that specify the details of the decentralization reform and the nature of the powers to be devolved to the school councils, and secondly a series of socio-political factors – the informal rules -- that shaped how the reform was implemented in practice, including the technical capacity of the ministry to provide communities with adequate information and training to manage the school, and the regularity and timeliness of ministry financial transfers that enable councils to buy school supplies and pay teachers.

With regard to community empowerment, the degrees of empowerment indicators related to a person's involvement in school council activities. Examples of assets included parents' prior engagement in or experience with other community organizations as well their awareness of the right to participate in the council. The opportunity structure, in this case, refers to formal or informal rules of inclusion and exclusion, such as those that determine whether or not

members of excluded groups could participate in public meetings and decision-making.

### ***Measuring empowerment for conflict resolution in Indonesia***

This study generated over seventy “conflict pathways case studies” or ethnographies of how particular social tensions and incidents of conflict played out in their local context, looking at how the different actors reacted to the different conflicts and either negotiated or failed to engage. Each case study included a summary of the case, its pre-history, evolution, attempts at resolution, impacts and aftermath. Collection of this qualitative data followed a quantitatively oriented sampling frame in order to construct a plausible counterfactual. Villages receiving KDP funding were compared to villages that did not and qualitative interviews were used to confirm the accuracy of those matches.

The Indonesia analysis focused mainly within the state and the societal domains and concentrated on the intermediary and local level. In the state domain it worked both with the legal sub-domain, looking at the ability of citizens to approach police and the ability of police and courts to apply the laws correctly and solve conflicts, and with the political sub-domain, looking at the functioning and accountability of the local authorities and the citizen participation in the local decision-making processes. Within the societal domain, indicators were focused around the sub-domain of the community looking at the associational as well as the social interaction among people with different identities.

The study team used the two terms of ‘countervailing power’ and ‘routines’ to structure their analysis, where people’s countervailing power in a given conflict relates to their agency and where the idea of

routines determining the outcomes of the conflicts is similar to the idea of opportunity structures.

### ***Measuring empowerment and social inclusion in Nepal.***

The Nepal country study covered the domains of the state and the society and concentrated on the intermediary and local levels. Data were collected on a wide range of assets hypothesized to have a relationship with empowerment outcomes. Assets included standard measures such as literacy and land ownership, as well as group membership, participation in training, and knowledge of rights. Indicators of opportunity structure focused on the rules (institutions) that governed social positioning, social interaction, physical mobility, violence, and economic security or vulnerability.

Degrees of empowerment indicators ranged from the ease with which people could approach legal services, to voting behavior, to the degree of control over various aspects of domestic life that different household members enjoy. Indicators of intra-community engagement and the manner in which people behave or are able to behave in that setting were also gathered.

## **4. Summary**

This paper places empowerment firmly within the actionable remit of those involved in designing policy and development interventions. Putting aside the valid and humanistic arguments for investing in empowerment, it is clear that there is a growing constituency that identifies empowerment as being critical to development outcomes, including poverty alleviation and growth. An approach to operational and analytic work on empowerment has been outlined that is based on a review and translation of historic and more



recent discussions of the substance and nature of power. The resultant framework is one that can be used to measure empowerment and to better understand the operational needs of implementing change to bring about empowerment.

The material referenced in this book demonstrates that, while empowerment is increasingly appearing in the logic and documentation of development agencies, there is diversity in definitions used and in analysis of causality. Both definitions and determinants tend to be specific to the intervention they reference or to the subject matter of the analysis. Diversity is certainly crucial to a relational concept such as empowerment. However, diversity in interpretation is both more credible and persuasive if it is rooted in solid principles and a well-articulated theory of social change. The five country studies have shown that such principles do, in different degrees, underlie the frameworks used for analysis in each location.

The approach suggested for measuring empowerment is a simple one comprising three core concepts: agency; opportunity structure; and degree of empowerment. These are further refined into clusters of indicators. A broad range of assets are used as indicators of agency. Measurement of the presence and operation of formal and informal institutions provides indicators of opportunity structure. The existence of choice, the use of choice, and the effectiveness of choice are used as indicators of the degree of empowerment a person or group experiences. Three domains (state, market, and society) are divided into a number of sub-domains, or stages in or upon which actors live out their lives. These sub-domains are differentiated according to the level at which actors operate—the macro, intermediary, and local levels.

Using this framework, empowerment can be measured within projects or interventions and priority areas for interventions that seek to further empowerment identified. It can also be used as the basis for in-depth research, for project- and national-level monitoring, and with certain caveats, for comparing the status of and changes in empowerment across countries.

The conceptualisation of empowerment as “effective choice” complements utilitarian approaches to the measurement of poverty. Large parts of economic theory hold that economic actors make rational utility-maximising decisions. A power-based analysis of institutions holds that rules are rarely neutral in their construction and impact, but tend to emerge to support the dominant ideology or frame of thinking in any given context. Rules are devised by those with sufficient bargaining strength and often “in the interests of private well-being rather than social well-being”.<sup>36</sup> By the same token, there is often no incentive for people to give up power in the interest of some common good/utility. In the absence of enforceable contracts and perfect information, power can be used by those with control over resources, information and decision making to compel people to do what they would not choose to do, sometimes through coercion or violence but often more subtly through the creation of consensus about the “rules of the game” which skew those rules in favor of the powerful. Institutions are resistant to change not only because of the conscious use of power by the powerful but because of the lack of consciousness amongst the powerless.

The analytic framework introduced here provides both a theory of change to explain the instrumental value of empowerment and an operational tool with which to design empowering interventions. The

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<sup>36</sup> North, 1993, 48

framework goes beyond income-based and utilitarian approaches to poverty. Empowerment is based on tackling the differences in capabilities that deny actors the capacity to make transforming choices.

The country cases have not only been used to test and refine the analytic framework but have provided insights on the relationship between empowerment investments, empowerment outcomes and development outcomes. They have also clearly demonstrated both the need for contextual sensitivity when attempting when measuring empowerment and that a unifying analytic framework can work in different settings.

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## Annex 1: BRAZIL: Participatory Budgeting, Empowerment and Development Outcomes<sup>37</sup>

Table A1.1: Descriptive Statistics Comparing PB Municípios with other Municípios

Indicator	Means for 103 municípios with PB in 1997-2000				Means for remaining 5300 municípios			
	1991	2000	% point chg.	Index of progress	1991	2000	% point chg.	Index of progress
<b>Municipal finance indicators</b>								
% of municipal expenditures: capital	18.05	14.10	-3.95		15.83	13.93	-1.89	
% of municipal expenditures: social assistance and pensions	3.84	7.19	3.35		7.80	6.51	-1.28	
% of municipal expenditures: education and culture	30.02	27.51	-2.51		25.53	33.79	8.26	
% of municipal expenditures: housing & urban development	16.49	10.38	-6.10		11.02	9.09	-1.93	
% of municipal expenditures: health and sanitation	7.49	22.29	14.79		17.53	17.47	-0.06	
% of municipal expenditures: deficit	8.02	-7.48	-15.49		6.97	-6.30	-13.27	
% of population with trash collection services	70.21	93.12	22.91	77.05	53.01	80.42	27.41	65.43
% of population with water from municipal network	70.62	75.72	5.10	31.37	46.11	58.69	12.57	30.36
% of population connected to municipal sanitation network	35.32	37.17	1.86	0.09	14.74	15.49	0.75	-0.45
% of population with electricity connection	90.45	96.30	5.85	47.10	69.62	86.88	17.26	56.91
% of children ages 7 to 14 NOT in school	14.74	3.34	-11.40	77.16	26.61	6.04	-20.57	77.23
% of children ages 15 to 17 NOT in school	46.07	20.61	-25.46	54.10	56.65	27.69	-28.96	50.61
Infant mortality rate (per 1000)	32.97	22.06	-10.91	32.76	49.27	33.97	-15.31	31.03
Under-five mortality rate (per 1000)	43.17	26.76	-16.41	38.31	67.12	44.46	-22.66	35.31
Human development index (0.00-lowest to 1.00-highest)	0.711	0.781	0.07	24.14	0.610	0.700	0.09	23.08
Per-capita annual income	215.4	297.6	38.2		121.2	170.3	40.5	
% of population INDIGENT	15.48	10.84	-4.64	3.94	32.70	24.67	-8.04	20.42
% of population POOR	34.87	25.71	-9.16	18.66	58.59	46.38	-12.21	21.94
% of CHILDREN ages 14 and below INDIGENT	20.57	16.12	-4.45	-4.93	41.08	33.25	-7.83	12.09
% of CHILDREN ages 14 and below POOR	42.89	35.68	-7.22	-1.45	67.09	57.83	-9.26	14.10
GINI coefficient of income inequality	0.535	0.553	0.02	-0.04	0.526	0.560	0.03	-0.07
Income share (%) of richest 10% of households	42.94	44.17	1.23		42.15	43.92	1.78	
Income share (%) of poorest 20% of households	3.54	2.99	-0.55		3.98	2.69	-1.29	

<sup>37</sup> Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Patrick Heller, Shubham Chaudhuri and Marcelo Kunrath Silva, 2005

**Table A1.2: Estimating the effects of participatory budgeting on multiple dimensions of development performance**

Indicator	Estimate of mean "effect" of participatory budgeting during 1997-2000 on			
	The CHANGE in indicator between 1991 and 2000			
	Naïve estimate	Controlling for initial conditions	Controlling for initial conditions and selection	Controlling for initial conditions, selection and heterogeneity
<b>Municipal finance indicators (percentage point changes)</b>				
% of municipal expenditures: capital	-1.65	0.34	-0.27	0.14
% of municipal expenditures: social assistance and pensions	4.50	0.46	0.79	0.38
% of municipal expenditures: education and culture	-10.56	-5.49	0.29	0.27
% of municipal expenditures: housing and urban development	-4.15	0.20	-0.28	-0.40
% of municipal expenditures: health and sanitation	14.94	4.15	6.23	6.32
% of municipal expenditures: deficit	-3.19	-3.05	0.16	0.46
<b>Public service delivery indicators (index of progress)</b>				
% of population with trash collection services	11.63	9.14	-11.07	-5.29
% of population with water from municipal network	1.01	0.96	33.12	9.86
% of population with municipal sanitation network	0.55	13.07	18.90	15.29
% of population with electricity connection	-9.81	-5.16	17.34	19.35
<b>Human development indicators (index of progress)</b>				
% of children ages 7 to 14 NOT in school	-0.07	1.27	5.57	1.14
% of children ages 15 to 17 NOT in school	3.49	5.84	4.09	1.22
Infant mortality rate (per 1000)	1.72	3.13	-7.89	-6.60
Under-five mortality rate (per 1000)	3.00	1.53	2.09	6.43
Human development index (0.00-lowest to 1.00-highest)	1.13	0.31	0.84	3.76
<b>Growth and inequality indicators (index of progress except where indicated)</b>				
Per-capita annual INCOME (% change)	-0.00	0.03	-0.02	0.02
% of population INDIGENT	-16.48	-8.76	40.86	73.83
% of population POOR	-3.27	-5.60	11.78	14.72
% of CHILDREN ages 14 and below INDIGENT	-17.03	-4.86	40.61	21.31
% of CHILDREN ages 14 and below POOR	-5.68	-5.99	10.64	16.99
GINI coefficient of income inequality (0.00 lowest to 1.00 highest)	0.04	0.02	0.07	0.05
Income share (%) of richest 10% of households (% point change)	-0.54	-0.37	-4.65	-5.78
Income share (%) of poorest 20% of households (% point change)	0.74	0.39	0.27	0.21

Notes: estimates in bold are significant at the 10% level or lower; estimates shaded and in bold are significant at the 5% level or lower.



## Annex 2

**Table A2.1: Explaining Economic Empowerment of Women<sup>38</sup>**

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	-			-	
	389.699	105.614		3.690	0.014
Schooling	108.841	18.792	2.480	5.792	0.002
Schooling square	-7.926	1.426	-2.275	-	0.003
				5.557	
Years of working experience	8.723	1.934	0.523	4.509	0.006
Negotiation skills	61.882	15.676	0.458	3.948	0.011
Days of sickness in last six months	-3.924	1.032	-0.437	-	0.013
				3.803	
Distance to produce market	-87.986	26.657	-0.424	-	0.021
				3.301	
Distance to main market for trading	11.332	1.431	0.779	7.919	0.001
Information Watch television Y/N	130.291	42.305	0.597	3.080	0.027
Distance from Telephone min	0.551	0.810	0.120	0.680	0.527
Social K Number of people can rely on for small amount of money	3.590	5.757	0.109	0.624	0.560
Father s education	-			-	
	129.361	35.221	-0.546	3.673	0.014
Economic Constraint Cultural restrictions	13.124	7.974	0.234	1.646	0.161
Region	-79.497	38.216	-0.349	-	0.092
				2.080	
WDIP Participant	100.993	33.047	0.403	3.056	0.028

A. Dependent Variable: Cash income –monthly  
 Source: Legovini 2005

**Table A2.2: Women’s Intra Household Power**

	WDIP Participant		
	WDIP Non-beneficiaries	WDIP Beneficiary	Total
	Mean	Mean	Mean
<b>Women who believe it is improper for a woman to:</b>			
Farm -plow/harvest	0.47	0.41	0.43
Fence/house construction & maintenance	0.19	0.26	0.24
Buy grains	0.03	0.03	0.03
Ride bike	0.40	0.43	0.42
Ride animal	0.26	0.19	0.22
Ride cart	0.43	0.37	0.39
Go to market alone	0.09	0.07	0.07
Walk at night alone	0.74	0.64	0.67
Go to a bar or club alone	0.88	0.83	0.84
Wear trousers	0.35	0.35	0.35
Trade cattle	0.26	0.23	0.24

<sup>38</sup> Legovini 2005

Disobey her husband	0.72	0.75	0.74
<b><i>Women who believe husband has a right to beat:</i></b>			
Regularly to maintain authority	0.03	0.05	0.05
When his wife disagrees openly with him	0.06	0.10	0.09
When his wife disobeys him	0.17	0.19	0.19
When wife does or say something he disapproves of	0.09	0.14	0.12
When he is jealous	0.06	0.12	0.10
When his wife cheats on him with another man	0.51	0.44	0.47
When she gives their money to someone else	0.37	0.27	0.30
When he is drunk	0.02	0.05	0.04
In other circumstances	0.20	0.29	0.25
Never	0.49	0.51	0.50
<b><i>Received training on:</i></b>			
Female genital mutilation	0.51	0.77	0.68
Milk teeth extraction	0.49	0.76	0.67
Early marriage	0.51	0.77	0.68
Women s rights	0.53	0.78	0.70
HIV/AIDS	0.56	0.82	0.73
Tattooing	0.46	0.76	0.66
<b><i>Daughters:</i></b>			
Will be genitally mutilated	0.06	0.11	0.09
Teeth will be extracted	0.03	0.10	0.08
Will marry before the age of 12	0.01	0.10	0.07
Will marry before the age of 18	0.06	0.13	0.11

### Annex 3

**Table A3.1: Step-wise regression against school council empowerment index, by number of variables entered<sup>39</sup>**

Independent Variable	Number of variables entered into the regression						
	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Duration of training (DUTR)	-.0048 (.0076)	-.0031 (.0080)	-.0032 (.0082)	.0060 (.0054)	.0071 (.0061)	.0145 (.0083)	.0258 (.0683)
Consultation of the Manual (CMAN)	.0538 (.0436)	.0881 (.0488) *	.0987 (.0556) *	.1373 (.0606) *	.1135 (.0748)	.0077 (.1109)	-.0528 (.3918)
Amount of time passed till AECO receives legal status (TIMELS)	-.0059 (.0382)	.0088 (.0436)	.0195 (.0479)	.1019 (.0598)	.0874 (.0683)	.0563 (.0682)	.0363 (.1522)
Amount of time passed between receipt of legal status and first transfer (TPTRANS)	-.0046 (.0474)	-.0178 (.0514)	-.0205 (.0568)	-.0003 (.0664)	.0190 (.0775)	-.0176 (.0778)	-.0217 (.1112)
Amount of time AECO needs to reach the bank (TIMEB)	-.0771 (.0748)	-.0761 (.0783)	-.0837 (.0808)	-.2228 (.0648) **	-.0223 (.3135)	.3448 (.4178)	.9196 (3.4709)
Promoter helps in administrative procedures (PROAD)	-.0440 (.0590)	-.0370 (.0661)	-.0428 (.0687)	-.0623 (.0773)	.0001 (.1266)	.1890 (.1940)	.3653 (1.0838)
Changes in promoters affect transfers (CHPRO)	.0309 (.0417)	.0475 (.0491)	.0332 (.0520)	.0257 (.0550)	.1664 (.2225)	.3606 (.2603)	.6695 (1.8740)
Salary delays affect administrative procedures (DEPAY)		-.0966 (.0493) *	-.1091 (.0520) **	-.1459 (.0468) **	-.1787 (.0712) *	-.1745 (.0660)	-.2083 (.2211)
Number of transfers in 2003 (NOTRANS)			.0296 (.0248)	.0497 (.0204) *	.0730 (.0418)	.0856 (.0401)	.1514 (.3956)
Extent of transfer delay (DETRANS)				.2359 (.0490) ***	.2239 (.0560) **	.1395 (.0864)	.0668 (.4490)
Index of community's poverty line (PL)					.0039 (.0060)	.0065 (.0059)	.0110 (.0284)
Index of community's unsatisfied basic needs (BN)						.0033 (.0027)	.0063 (.0185)
Average education levels (MEDL)							-.0635 (.3779)
<i>R squared</i>	-.0555	.0311	.0207	.6953	.6447	.6950	.4068
<i>F</i>	.6696	1.1485	1.0823	4.1950	3.3097	3.6586	1.7384

*The standard error is given in parenthesis.*

*The level of significance is: \* = t < 0.1, \*\* = t < .05. \*\*\* = t < .01.*

<sup>39</sup> di Groppele and Heinsohn

## Annex 4

**Figure A4: Routines for Managing Local Conflict<sup>40</sup>**

STYLE OF ASSOCIATIONAL INTERACTION	TYPES OF POWER	
	AUTARCHIC	COUNTERVAILING
<b>TOP-DOWN, ADVERSARIAL</b>	<b>II. Elite Capture</b> "Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism" - KDP Year 1 Kecamatan Proppo, EJ - Many Examples <i>Lack of Agency, lack of Opportunity Structure</i>	<b>I. Interest Group Politics</b> Elected or appointed interest groups forced (often by election cycles) into giving patronage to marginalized groups which may acquire interest group status - Ponorogo Dam Case <i>Perhaps increase in Agency, but no lasting change of Opportunity Structure</i>
<b>PARTICIPATORY, COLLABORATIVE</b>	<b>III. Access, Little or no Influence</b> - <u>Poorly functioning KDP forums</u> : marginalized groups have seat at table, but generate no inducement for elites to collaborate; elites dominate forums via agenda-setting/limiting, participant restriction, reduction of inputs to ignorable advice - KDP Year 2, Proppo <i>Change in formal Opportunity Structure but informal hierarchical structures still embedded</i>	<b>IV. Adaptive Problem Solving</b> - <u>Well-functioning KDP forums</u> : marginalized groups maximize their seat at the table by combining: (a) public displays of their strength outside of collaborative forums (via adversarial organizations, political parties) with (b) context-revising discursive and practical routines within such forums resulting in "adaptive" problem-solving - Few examples <i>Actors empowered to transform Opportunity Structure</i>

The movement from Box III to Box IV represents the great empowerment challenge and opportunity for community driven development projects, including KDP. The adaptive problem solving style referred to in Box IV requires a rare convergence of *both* well functioning participatory/collaborative process *and* the development of countervailing power among marginalized groups. This combination adds up to more than the sum of its parts. It is one matter for marginalized groups to gain access to development forums traditionally dominated by elites who invariably appear in any development process. It is another matter altogether for marginalized groups to have already built coalitions with other marginalized groups before CDD interventions arrive in a community, not least because such groups may typically face a dearth of opportunities for formal associational interaction. When they do, however, such groups may enter collaborative processes from a point of strength and informal power. The combination of these two qualities has great potential to translate into sustained and formalized power by previously excluded groups. When CDD project creators refer to this synergistic reaction, it is often assumed that powerless groups already possess systems of countervailing power and a range of different assets when they typically do not.

<sup>40</sup> Gibson and Woolcock, 2005



## Annex 5


**Table A5.1 Multiple Regression Estimates of the influence of caste and ethnicity on women's empowerment and inclusion**

Variables	B	Std. Error	Sig.
BCN	.914	1.368	.504
Middle	4.013	2.393	.094
Janajati	-.459	1.368	.738
Age	.225	.062	.000
Completed Grades	.411	.184	.026
Wealth Scale	.137	.306	.655
Group membership	3.195	1.159	.006
Exposure to media/Place	2.962	1.498	.048
Fluency of Nepali Language	1.266	1.251	.312
More than 5 Km	-.441	.994	.657
Knowledge of Women's Legal Rights	3.351	2.413	.165
Contact with WDO	3.800	1.648	.021
Constant	45.859	3.036	.000

Significant variables:

1. age (higher the age higher the level of women's empowerment and inclusion)
2. Level of education (higher the level of education higher the level of women's empowerment and inclusion)
3. Group membership (members have higher the level of women's empowerment and inclusion than non-members)
4. Exposure to media/places (higher the exposure higher the level of women's empowerment and inclusion)
5. Contact with WDO (higher the level of contact with WDO higher the level of women's empowerment and inclusion)

**Figure A5.1**





## Annex 6: Comparing country case indicators used for each domain<sup>41</sup>

Indicators do not always reflect their actual categorization in the study. In this table, we have adapted the classification (not content) of indicators to illustrate the analytical framework.

STATE DOMAIN				
Case Country	Indicator of:	Macro level	Intermediary level	Local level
Brazil	Agency (A) <sup>1</sup>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of NGOs per city &amp; per capita</li> <li>• Per capita income of civil society</li> <li>• Literacy rates of civil society</li> <li>• Degree of self-organization of civil society organizations (registration, members etc)</li> </ul>	
	Opportunity Structure (OS) <sup>2</sup>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of budget allocations with civil society participation</li> <li>• Number of projects monitored with civil society participation</li> <li>• Number of government activities with participation from marginalized groups</li> <li>• Number of decisions regarding service delivery with civil society participation</li> <li>• Availability of information about budget (Budget accessible through internet, all posts on budget public etc)</li> </ul>	
	Degree of Empowerment (DOE) <sup>3</sup>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No of public health clinics in municipio (development outcome)</li> <li>• No of principal hospitals in municipio (development outcome)</li> <li>• Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births (development outcome)</li> <li>• No. of death from infectious diseases</li> </ul>	

<sup>41</sup> Matrix prepared by Mette Bertlesen, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>per 100.000 (development outcome)</li> <li>No. of ambulances (development outcome)</li> <li>No. of primary/secondary schools in municipio (development outcome)</li> <li>Gross enrolment rate in primary/secondary schools (development outcome)</li> </ul>	
Ethiopia	Agency (A) <sup>1</sup>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Education levels</li> <li>Levels of self-confidence</li> <li>Percentage of women who participate in a community group</li> <li>Amount of time passed since joining the group, if any</li> <li>Percentage of women who are members of a political party</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Education levels</li> <li>Levels of self-confidence</li> <li>Percentage of women who participate in a community group</li> <li>Amount of time passed since joining the group, if any</li> <li>Percentage of women who are members of a political party</li> </ul>
	Opportunity Structure (OS) <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existence of laws that treat men and women differently</li> <li>Existence of informal rules that treat men and women differently</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existence of laws that treat men and women differently</li> <li>Existence of informal rules that treat men and women differently</li> <li>Cases where formal laws contradict informal rules and traditional procedures</li> <li>Extent to which men regard women as equal to them</li> <li>Likelihood of a woman obtaining justice in disputes between a man and a woman</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existence of laws that treat men and women differently</li> <li>Existence of informal rules that treat men and women differently</li> <li>Cases where formal laws contradict informal rules and traditional procedures</li> <li>Extent to which men regard women as equal to them</li> <li>Likelihood of a woman obtaining justice in disputes between a man and a woman</li> </ul>
	Degree of Empowerment (DOE) <sup>3</sup>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extent to which women are equally represented in district councils (compared to men)</li> <li></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extent to which women are equally represented in village councils (compared to men)</li> <li></li> </ul>
Honduras	Agency (A) <sup>1</sup>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Percentage of schools councils that are informed of the requirement to acquire legal status to open up a bank account</li> <li>Percentage of councils that possess an operational manual that lists their responsibilities</li> <li>Percentage of councils that have opened a bank account to receive</li> </ul>

				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>transfers from the government</li> <li>Percentage of councils that file (1) bank statements, (2) receipts of purchases and payments, (3) receipts of transfers</li> <li>Percentage of councils that have received training on budgetary matters</li> <li>Duration of the training</li> <li>Levels of perceived usefulness of the training</li> </ul>
	Opportunity Structure (OS) <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Legislation grants school councils the right to oversee their budgets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Legislation grants school councils the right to oversee their budgets</li> <li>Extent to which other actors (school principal, mayor, council member, PROHECO district or departmental officer) intervene in budget oversight</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Legislation grants school councils the right to oversee their budgets</li> <li>Provision is made to inform councils about their budget responsibilities</li> <li>Provision is made to train councils about budget responsibilities</li> <li>Extent to which other actors (school principal, mayor, council member, PROHECO district or departmental officer) intervene in budget oversight</li> </ul>
	Degree of Empowerment (DOE) <sup>3</sup>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extent to which school councils are able to comply with the tasks devolved to them (number of tasks managed, timeliness of compliance etc)</li> <li>Percentage of women and the poorest members of the community participating in school council meetings</li> </ul>
Indonesia	Agency (A) <sup>1</sup>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ability of citizens to approach police</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ability of citizens to approach police</li> <li>Number of women participating in the KDP councils</li> <li>Villagers' ability to access information on KDP funds and functions</li> </ul>
	Opportunity Structure (OS) <sup>2</sup>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Efficiency of police to solve conflicts (percentage of conflicts reported, percentage of conflicts solved etc)</li> <li>Ability of the police to apply the law</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Efficiency of police to solve conflicts</li> <li>Ability of the police to apply the law correctly</li> <li>Ability of courts to solve conflicts</li> </ul>

			<p>correctly</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ability of courts to solve conflicts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Efficiency of village government in addressing problems</li> <li>• Number of villages where councils had been elected according to official KDP procedures</li> </ul>
	Degree of Empowerment (DOE) <sup>3</sup>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of conflicts resolved in KDP villages (and in non-KDP villages)</li> <li>• Number and type of coalitions formed among villagers in order to resolve conflicts</li> <li>• Number of routines changed as a way of solving conflicts in the villages</li> </ul>
Nepal	Agency (A) <sup>1</sup>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Literacy levels</li> <li>• Monthly income levels</li> <li>• Size of land household owns</li> <li>• Perceived levels of wealth</li> <li>• Number of livestock household raises</li> <li>• Participation in training events on the rights of low castes/indigenous peoples</li> <li>• Membership in (1) externally organized groups, such as credit/saving group, users' group, women's group, (2) traditional indigenous organizations</li> <li>• Extent of awareness of the candidates who ran for office</li> </ul>
	Opportunity Structure (OS) <sup>2</sup>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Perceived levels of respect with which members of one caste/ethnicity are treated by members of other castes/ethnicities</li> <li>• Perceived degree of security relative to other castes/ethnicities</li> <li>• Perceived levels of opportunity for improvement relative to other castes/ethnicities</li> <li>• Respondent is restricted from entering certain public areas, such as village district office</li> <li>• Perceived levels of improvements in</li> </ul>

				the status of indigenous people's rights since 1990
	Degree of Empowerment (DOE) <sup>3</sup>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extent to which the respondents find it easy to approach the police or a court</li> <li>• The extent to which they feel that they are treated fairly by the police or by a court</li> <li>• Percentage of cases where district development agencies met people's requests</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extent to which the respondents find it easy to approach the police or a court</li> <li>• The extent to which they feel that they are treated fairly by the police or by a court</li> <li>• Percentage of cases where local development agencies met people's requests</li> </ul>

<sup>1</sup> Agency: measured through endowment of psychological, informational, organizational, material, financial, and human assets.

<sup>2</sup> Opportunity Structure: measured through presence and operation of informal and formal rules.

<sup>3</sup> Degree of Empowerment: measured through presence of choice, use of choice (direct or indirect), effectiveness of choice.

MARKET DOMAIN				
Case Country	Indicator of:	Macro level	Intermediary level	Local level
Brazil	Agency (A) <sup>1</sup>		•	
	Opportunity Structure (OS) <sup>2</sup>			
	Degree of Empowerment (DOE) <sup>3</sup>			
Ethiopia	Agency (A) <sup>1</sup>		•	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Levels of literacy</li> <li>• Income levels and household income shares</li> <li>• Possession of job-specific skills</li> <li>• Percentage of women who have access to and use information from the radio, TV, newspaper, post office or telephone</li> <li>• Percentage of women who participate in a community group</li> <li>• Amount of time passed since joining the group, if any</li> <li>• Percentage of women who are members of a credit and savings association or other community group</li> </ul>
	Opportunity Structure (OS) <sup>2</sup>	•	•	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Laws grant equal rights to men and women</li> <li>• Women can demand equal work conditions to those of men</li> <li>• Distance to the nearest market</li> <li>• Extend to which other household members (husband, parents, children) participate in such chores as fetching water and firewood, cleaning,</li> </ul>



				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>cooking, grocery shopping etc</li> <li>Extend to which government provides job-related training</li> <li>Extend to which cultural restrictions determine which professions women are allowed to use</li> <li>Lenders trust women as much as men regarding the repayment of debts</li> </ul>
	Degree of Empowerment (DOE) <sup>3</sup>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extent to which women choose their type of employment, negotiate working conditions with their employers and to which they have access to credit</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extent to which women choose their type of employment, negotiate working conditions with their employers and to which they have access to credit</li> </ul>
Honduras	Agency (A) <sup>1</sup>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	Opportunity Structure (OS) <sup>2</sup>	L		
	Degree of Empowerment (DOE) <sup>3</sup>			
Indonesia	Agency (A) <sup>1</sup>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
	Opportunity Structure (OS) <sup>2</sup>			
	Degree of Empowerment (DOE) <sup>3</sup>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>
Nepal	Agency (A) <sup>1</sup>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Percentage of members of disadvantaged groups employed in public sector</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Percentage of citizens with access to credit</li> <li>Percentage of members of disadvantaged groups who are employed in public sector</li> <li>Percentage of households with access to water and sanitation</li> </ul>

	Opportunity Structure (OS) <sup>2</sup>			•
	Degree of Empowerment (DOE) <sup>3</sup>		•	•

<sup>1</sup> Agency: measured through endowment of psychological, informational, organizational, material, financial, and human assets.  
<sup>2</sup> Opportunity Structure: measured through presence and operation of informal and formal rules.  
<sup>3</sup> Degree of Empowerment: measured through presence of choice, use of choice (direct or indirect), effectiveness of choice.

Indicators do not always reflect their actual categorization in the study. In this table, we have adapted the classification (not content) of indicators to illustrate the analytical framework.

SOCIETAL DOMAIN				
Case Country	Indicator of:	Macro level	Intermediary level	Local level
Brazil	Agency (A) <sup>1</sup>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of registered neighborhood assoc, NGOs, civil society groups</li> <li>• Number of registered umbrella groups</li> <li>• Number of members in above groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of registered neighborhood assoc, NGOs, civil society groups</li> <li>• Number of registered umbrella groups</li> <li>• Number of members in above groups</li> </ul>
	Opportunity Structure (OS) <sup>2</sup>			
	Degree of Empowerment (DOE) <sup>3</sup>			
Ethiopia	Agency (A) <sup>1</sup>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Percentage of women who have received training on women's rights, female genital mutilation, milk tooth extraction, early marriage</li> <li>• Percentage of women who participate in a community group</li> <li>• Amount of time passed since joining the group, if any</li> <li>• Levels of self confidence</li> <li>• Extent of awareness of reproductive health issues</li> </ul>
	Opportunity Structure (OS) <sup>2</sup>	•	•	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Laws protect women from domestic violence</li> <li>• Extent to which women are treated equally under the law in practice</li> <li>• Operation of non-formal courts that discriminate against women</li> <li>• Perception of men/women that domestic violence is acceptable</li> <li>• Extent to which men are punished in courts for committing acts of</li> </ul>

				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>domestic violence</li> <li>Extend to which women are allowed to participate in communal meetings</li> </ul>
	Degree of Empowerment (DOE) <sup>3</sup>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Percentage of women who take action against harmful traditional practices (female genital mutilation, milk tooth extraction etc)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Percentage of women who take action against harmful traditional practices (female genital mutilation, milk tooth extraction etc)</li> </ul>
Honduras	Agency (A) <sup>1</sup>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Percentage of women and of poorest members who are literate</li> <li>Percentage of women and of the poorest members who are aware of when council meetings take place</li> <li>Percentage of women and of the poorest who understand what type of decisions are made during the meetings</li> <li>Percentage of women and of the poorest who have received training regarding the council's functions</li> <li>Levels of perceived effectiveness of training</li> <li>Percentage of women and of the poorest members who are involved in other community organizations</li> <li>Type of position held in other organization, if any</li> </ul>
	Opportunity Structure (OS) <sup>2</sup>	•	•	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Women are included in public decision-making</li> <li>The poorest members are included in public decision-making</li> </ul>
	Degree of Empowerment (DOE) <sup>3</sup>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Percentage of women and of the poorest members who participate in school council meetings</li> </ul>
Indonesia	Agency (A) <sup>1</sup>		•	•

	Opportunity Structure (OS) <sup>2</sup>		•	•
	Degree of Empowerment (DOE) <sup>3</sup>			•
Nepal	Agency (A) <sup>1</sup>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Literacy levels</li> <li>• Monthly income levels</li> <li>• Membership in (1) externally organized groups, such as credit/saving group, users' group, women's group, (2) traditional indigenous organizations</li> <li>• Participation in training events on women's rights</li> <li>• Extent of awareness over women's rights</li> </ul>
	Opportunity Structure (OS) <sup>2</sup>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Frequency with which women are subject to domestic violence (verbal and physical harassment)</li> <li>• Perceived levels of improvement in the status of women's rights since 1990</li> <li>• Perceived levels of economic success of own caste/ ethnicity</li> <li>• Perceived levels of improvement in the status of indigenous people's rights since 1990</li> <li>• Perceived levels of opportunity for improvement relative to other castes/ethnicities</li> <li>• Perceived degree of security relative to other castes/ethnicities</li> </ul>
	Degree of Empowerment (DOE) <sup>3</sup>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Frequency with which respondents were verbally harassed, threatened, or physically assaulted by 1) high</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Frequency with which respondents were verbally harassed, threatened, or physically assaulted by 1) high</li> </ul>

			caste people, 2) police, 3) other groups of people <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Respondents were able to get help regarding these incidences with police or authorities</li> <li>• Perceived levels of usefulness of attempts to get help</li> </ul>	caste people, 2) police, 3) other groups of people <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Respondents were able to get help regarding these incidences with police or authorities</li> <li>• Perceived levels of usefulness of attempts to get help</li> </ul>
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<sup>1</sup> Agency: measured through endowment of psychological, informational, organizational, material, financial, and human assets.  
<sup>2</sup> Opportunity Structure: measured through presence and operation of informal and formal rules.  
<sup>3</sup> Degree of Empowerment: measured through presence of choice, use of choice (direct or indirect), effectiveness of choice.

Indicators do not always reflect their actual categorization in the study. In this table, the classification (not content) of indicators has been adapted to illustrate the analytical framework.



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